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Abstract  
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the relatively scarce published research on the 
relationship between European integration and banking efficiency. Estimating cost translog 
frontier functions for different panels of European Union countries for the time period 1994-
2008 we conclude that there is always technical inefficiency. Additionally, although country 
inefficiencies have decreased in recent years (2000-2008), there are no remarkable changes in 
the countries’ ranking positions. Our results also point to the existence of a quite slow 
convergence process across EU countries during the period analysed, as well as its acceleration 
after the establishment of the European Monetary Union.  
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European integration and banking efficiency: a panel cost frontier approach 
 
1. Introduction  
In recent years, financial systems have been experiencing the consequences of the strong 
imbalances and turbulence of the US sub-prime mortgage market, which affected different 
segments of the international money and credit markets and revealed the fragility of many 
financial institutions. 
The ensuing crisis has raised attention to the importance of studies aiming to identify the factors 
explaining the weaknesses in the financial systems at national and international levels. It has 
also intensified the questioning of the role of the financial authorities and their policy responses 
in order to detect the symptoms of fragility and prevent further crisis and instability. 
It remains true that the European Union (EU) financial and credit systems are bank-dominated 
and among EU regulators, there is a strong belief that a well-integrated financial system is a 
necessary precondition for the enhancement of financial stability and the increased efficiency of 
the entire EU economy.  
Moreover, the process of financial integration is often presented as a necessary pre-requisite for 
the adoption of the euro and the implementation of the single monetary policy, with the 
predominance of the banking intermediation in the context of the EU (Cabral et al., 2002; 
European Central Bank, 2003; Hartmann et al., 2003; Baele et al., 2004; Sørensen and 
Gutiérrez, 2006; Arghyrou et al., 2009). 
The establishment of the European Monetary Union was supposed to accelerate the process of 
consolidation and economic and financial integration. However, there is no clear consensus on 
the evidence of increasing consolidation and integration of the European markets. Some 
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empirical studies conclude that there is evidence of integration, particularly of the European 
money market, but also to some extent of the bond and equity markets (Cabral et al. 2002; 
Hartmann et al., 2003; Guiso et al., 2004; Manna, 2004; Cappiello et al., 2006; Bos and 
Schmiedel, 2007).  Other empirical contributions have concluded that the European financial 
markets are far from being integrated (Gardener et al., 2002; Schure et al. 2004; Dermine, 2006; 
European Central Bank, 2007; European Central Bank, 2008; Affinito and Farabullini, 2009; 
Gropp and Kashyap, 2010).  
The European banking institutions play a unique role, first in the context of the Single Market 
Program and then of the European Monetary Union, as the increase of competition in all 
financial-product market segments was expected to contribute to price and cost reductions and 
benefit the exploitation of scale economies.  
There is a large strand of literature on the analysis of the determinants of efficiency and 
particularly on the empirical measurement of the profit and cost efficiency in banking (among 
others, Altunbas et al., 2001; Goddard et al. 2001, 2007; Williams and Nguyen, 2005; Kasman 
and Yildirim, 2006; Barros et al. 2007; Berger, 2007; Hughes and Mester, 2008; Sturm and 
Williams, 2010).   
Nonetheless, few studies have clearly addressed the relationship between European integration 
and banking efficiency. The main examples are to be found in Tortosa-Ausina (2002), Murinde 
et al., (2004), Holló and Nagy (2006), Weill (2004, 2009) and Casu and Girardone (2009, 
2010). 
 
This paper tests banking efficiency across European Union countries in the wake of the recent 
crisis, estimating translog cost frontier functions and comparing the results for different samples 
of EU countries: all European Union members (EU-27), the “old” members (EU-15) and those 
that joined the Union during the last decade (EU-12) for the time period 1994-2008 and for the 
4 
 
years after the introduction of the single currency (2000-2008). The conclusions point to the 
existence of statistically relevant technical inefficiencies, although these have tended to decrease 
during the last decade. Furthermore, the analysis of the convergence process with the estimation 
of β-convergence models allows us to conclude that there is clear convergence in banking 
efficiency across EU countries and that the pace of convergence increased slightly after the 
implementation of the EMU.   
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical framework and a brief 
literature review; the methodology and the data are presented in Section 3; Section 4 reports the 
obtained results; Section 5 discusses these results and concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical framework and brief literature review  
Over recent years, the research into the role and performance of the banking industry has paid 
particular attention to the estimation of bank efficiency, explaining the variations in efficiencies 
across banks and countries. Although European research on bank efficiency has not yet matched 
the record of the US contributions, it has increased enormously since the dynamic changes were 
introduced into the structure of European banking. 
There is a strand of literature that focuses on the heterogeneities across banks, explaining them 
by the differences in the performance conditions, such as bank size (Altunbas et al., 2001; 
Molyneux, 2003; Bikker et al., 2006; Schaeck and Cihak, 2007), bank ownership (Bonin et al., 
2005; Kasman and Yildirim, 2006; Lensink et al., 2008), bank mergers (Diaz et al., 2004; 
Campa and Hernando, 2006; Altunbas and Marquês, 2008), technological progress (Wheelock 
and Wilson, 1999; Berger, 2003; Casu et al., 2004) financial deregulation (Kumbhakar et al., 
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2001; Vives, 2001; Goddard et al., 2007) and legal tradition (Berger et al., 2001; Beck et al., 
2003-a; 2003-b; Barros et al., 2007). 
The analysis of bank cost efficiency is based on the assumption that the performance of each 
individual bank can be described by a production function that links banking outputs to the 
necessary banking inputs. However, there is no consensus concerning the definition of the 
banking outputs. The discussion is mainly on the specific role of deposits, since they may be 
considered both as inputs and outputs of the production function. 
According to the production approach, banks provide services related to loans and deposits and, 
like other producers of goods or services, they use labour and capital as inputs of a given 
production function (see inter alia, Berger and Humphrey, 1991; Resti, 1997; Rossi et al. 2005).  
The intermediation approach considers that banks are mainly intermediaries between the 
economic agents with excess financing capacity and those economic agents that need financial 
support for their investments. Banks attract deposits and other funds and, using labour and other 
types of inputs such as buildings, equipment, or technology, they transform these funds into 
loans and investment securities. This approach has been used, for instance, by Sealey and 
Lindley (1977), Berger and Mester (1997), Altunbas et al. (2001), Bos and Kool (2006) and 
Barros et al. (2007). 
The research into efficiency, either by the production approach or by the intermediation 
approach, is based on the estimation of an efficiency frontier with the best combinations of the 
different inputs and outputs of the production process and then on the analysis of the deviation 
from the frontier that corresponds to the losses of efficiency. 
Most of the empirical studies on the measurement of bank efficiencies adopt either non-
parametric methods, particularly the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), or parametric methods, 
like the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), which estimate efficiency based on economic 
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optimisation (maximisation of profits or minimisation of costs), given the assumption of a 
stochastic optimal frontier. 
Following the pioneering contribution of Farrel (1957), the SFA has been developed by such 
authors as Aigner et al. (1977), Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), Stevenson (1980), Battese 
and Coelli (1988, 1992, 1995), Frerier and Lowell (1990), Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), 
Altunbas et al. (2001) and Coelli et al. (2005).   
According to Altunbas et al. (2001), the single equation stochastic cost function model can be 
represented by the following expression: ε+= ),( ji PQTCTC , where TC is the  total cost, Q is 
the vector of outputs, P is the input-price vector and ε is the error (a formal presentation of the 
cost function for panel data models is to be found in Appendix I).   
The error of this cost function can be decomposed into vu +=ε , where u and v are 
independently distributed. The first part of this sum, u, is assumed to be a positive disturbance, 
capturing the effects of the inefficiency or the weaknesses in the managerial performance, and is 
distributed as half-normal and is truncated at zero, ( )[ ]2,~ uu σµ+Ν ,  with non-zero µ mean, as 
each unit´s production must lie on or below its production frontier but above zero. The second 
part of the error, v, is assumed to be distributed as two-sided normal, with zero mean and 
variance 2vσ  and it represents the random disturbances. 
As the estimation of the presented cost function provides only the value of the error term, ε, the 
value of  inefficient term, u, must be obtained indirectly. Following Jondrow et al. (1982) and 
Greene (1990, 2003, 2008) the total variance can be expressed as 222 vu σσσ += , where the 


















λ = is a measure of the relative contribution of the inefficient term.  
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=  ; 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. If γ is close to zero, the differences in the 
cost will be entirely related to statistical noise, while a γ close to one reveals the presence of 
technical inefficiency.  
 
The theoretical background to financial integration can be found in the large strand of literature 
that analyses price convergence, particularly in the different versions of the Law of One Price. 
The Law of One Price simply states that “identical goods must have identical prices”. It is a 
fundamental and intuitive proposition and it is usually considered as one of the most basic laws 
in economics (Lamont and Thaler, 2003). This law is based on the assumption that price 
differences would provide an opportunity for arbitrage and, in the absence of transaction costs, 
the arbitrageurs would lead to price convergence.  
Some authors (e.g. Baele et al., 2004; European Central Bank, 2007, 2008; Casu and Girardone, 
2009, 2010) consider that full integration in the financial markets means that all potential agents 
in these markets, facing a single set of financial instruments and/or services, follow a single set 
of decision rules, have equal access to these financial instruments and/or services and are treated 
equally when acting in these markets. 
This concept of financial integration, which is closely related to the Law of One Price, supposes 
that financial integration is independent of the financial structures within countries or regions. 
Several works have discussed and empirically tested the validity of this law, recognising the 
existence of some caveats, since markets may be incomplete, in which case financial integration 
will not benefit all agents acting in these markets (e.g. Allen and Gale, 1997; Baele et al., 2004).  
For different euro-area countries, Hartmann et al. (2003) find that there is no support for the 
argument that financial integration leads to convergence in the financial structures. Baele et al. 
8 
 
(2004) consider five key euro-area markets (money, government bonds, corporate bonds, 
banking/credit and equity markets) and conclude that these distinct market sectors have attained 
different levels of integration. Casu and Girardone (2009, 2010) also state that despite the 
regulatory emphasis, the process of integration of the EU financial services sector has been 
slower than in other sectors and there still remain real obstacles to the integration. 
Borrowing the concepts σ-convergence and β-convergence from the economic growth theory 
and the contributions of authors like Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Quah (1996) or, 
specifically for panel data, Weill (2009), a β-convergence test to access the speed of integration 








,1,1,, lnlnln εβα  
Where:   BPerfi,t = bank performance in country i (i = 1, ...n) in year t (t = 1, ... T) 
 Di = country dummies  
 ε = error term 
 
A negative value of the parameter β implies convergence, and this convergence will be as fast 
as β is high. 
 
 
3. Methodology and data used 
In this paper, we follow the intermediation approach and we specify a linear cost function with 
three outputs (loans, securities and other earning assets) and the price of three inputs (borrowed 
funds, physical capital and labour).  




































  C = total cost (i = 1,..., N = number of the countries included in each panel; t = 
1,...,T = time period) 
 y = outputs (r,s = 1, ..., R) 
 w = inputs (h,k = 1, ..., H) 
 z = other explaining variables (m = 1, ..., M) 
 t = time trend  
     
 Our data are sourced from the BankScope database. The sample comprises annual data from 
consolidated accounts of the commercial and saving banks of all EU countries between 1994 
and 2008.  In Appendix II, we present the number of banks of each country in 1994, 2000 and 
2008 and also the average number of the entire period (1994-2008). 
We define the input prices and the outputs (quantities) of the cost function and we use the 
following variables: 
• Dependent variable = Total cost (TC) = natural logarithm of the sum of the 
interest expenses plus the total operating expenses  
 
• Outputs:  
o  Y1 = Total loans = natural logarithm of the loans 
o  Y2 = Total securities = natural logarithm of the total securities 
o  Y3 = Other earning assets = natural logarithm of the difference between the 
total earning assets and the total loans 
 
• Inputs: 
o  W1 = Price of borrowed funds = natural logarithm of the ratio interest 
expenses over the sum of deposits 
o  W2 = Price of physical capital = natural logarithm of the ratio non-interest 
expenses over fixed assets 
o  W3 = Price of labour = natural logarithm of the ratio personnel expenses over 
the number of employees 
 
• Other variables:  
o   Z1 = Number of banks = natural logarithm of the number of banks included in 
the panels 
o   Z2 = Equity ratio  = natural logarithm of the ratio equity over total assets 
o   Z3 = Ratio revenue over expenses   = natural logarithm of the ratio of the total 
revenue  over the  total expenses 
o t = Time trend 
 
In our estimations we consider three sets of EU countries:  




• EU-15 – comprising the 15 “old” EU member-states: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK. 
 
• EU-12 – comprising the 12 member-states that have joined the union since 
2004: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
 
In order to analyse the possible influences of the implementation of the EMU in our estimations, 
we define two time periods: 1994-2008 and 2000-2008. 
 
The convergence in banking efficiency across the different panels will be tested through the 








,1, εβα  
Where:   BEi,t = bank efficiency in country i (i = 1, ...n) in year t (t = 1, ... T) 
 ∆ BE= BEi,t - BEi,t-1   
 Di = country dummies  
 
 
4. Empirical results  
The results obtained with the translog cost frontier function are presented in Appendix III. The 
information provided on the Wald tests and the log of the likelihood allows us to conclude that 
in all considered panels, the specified cost function fits the data well and the null hypothesis that 
there is no inefficiency component is rejected. Furthermore, in all situations the frontier 
parameters are statistically significant (see the bottom lines of Appendix III). 
The high values of the mean, µ, of the first part of the cost function’s error, capturing the effects 
of the inefficiency, as we defined above, indicates that in all circumstances (see Table 1 below, 
with the values taken from Appendix III), technical inefficiencies exist and they are statistically 
important, so the use of a traditional cost function with no technical inefficiency effects would 
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not be an adequate representation of the data. A more careful observation of the z values 
provided in Table 1 allows us to conclude that according to the statistical significance of this 
mean, the existence of technical inefficiencies is particularly clear for the time period 2000-
2008 and also for the panels that include all EU countries (EU-27) for both time periods (1994-
2008 and 2000-2008). 
TABLE 1 – Summary of the results obtained for the mean, µ 
 
Variable 1994 – 2008 2000 – 2008
 EU27 EU15 EU12 EU27 EU15 EU12 
mu       
coefficient .9236     .2838   .2703     .6571   .3868   .5147    
z 4.06    1.04   2.63   4.39   3.24   4.34    
P>|z| 0.000 0.296 0.009 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 
The presence of inefficiency is also confirmed by the high values of the contribution of the 








= , which are reported 
in Table 2, reveal that in almost all panels, the inefficient error term amounts to more than 97%. 
This implies that in almost all situations, the variation of the total cost among the different EU 
countries was due to the differences in their cost inefficiencies. The only exception is the panel 
including the newest EU member states (EU-12) for the time period 1994-2000, but the 
differences in the  cost inefficiency still contributes to 85% of the variation of the total cost. 
 
TABLE 2 – Summary of the results obtained for the contribution of the inefficient 
error term to total variance, γ 
 
Variable 1994 – 2008 2000 – 2008
 EU27 EU15 EU12 EU27 EU15 EU12 
gamma       
Coefficient .9875   .9801   .8492   .9846   .9741   .9689    




These results are confirmed by the comparison of the values of the variances of the inefficient 
error term (σu) and the random disturbances (σv) which are shown in Table 3. The comparison 
of the different columns allows us to conclude that for the EU-27 and EU-15 panels, the 
heterogeneity in the entire period (1994-2008) clearly diminishes in the more recent years 
(2000-2008). Moreover, in both periods, the EU-12 panel is more homogeneous than the EU-15, 
the latter being much more homogeneous than the EU-27 panel. 
 
TABLE 3 – Summary of the results obtained for the variance of the inefficient 
error term (σu) and the noise (σv)  
 
Variable 1994 – 2008 2000 – 2008
 EU27 EU15 EU12 EU27 EU15 EU12 
sigma_u2       
Coefficient .4973    .1641     .0302   .1957   .0729   .0688    
Standard error .2205 .1632 .0191 .0995 .0462713 .0379 
       
sigma_v2       
Coefficient .0063    .0033   .0054   .0031   .0019    .0022    
Standard error .0005 .0003 .0006 .0003 .0003 .0003 
 
According to the estimation results of the cost function, which are also presented in Appendix 
III, we can see that, as expected, the number of the included banks (Z1) increases the total cost. 
The same happens with the equity ratio (Z2), while the ratio revenue over expenses decreases 
the total cost. 
In all situations, the total cost decreases with the trend (t) and increases with the total provided 
loans (Y1) and total securities (Y2). With reference to the third output, the “other earning assets” 
(Y3), the influence in the total cost is not so clear. Particularly since 2000, the total cost 
decreases with these earning assets, but not with its squares (Y3Y3).   
On the other hand, the total cost clearly increases with the price of the borrowed funds (W1), but 
almost always decreases with the other two inputs, the price of physical capital (W2) and the 
price of labour (W3), but not with their products. In order to check this mixed influence of the 
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inputs in the total cost, we also estimated a simplified model1, in which we include only the 
outputs, the inputs and the time trend as explanatory variables. The results obtained are reported 
in Appendix IV and they reveal the importance of these variables to the total cost, confirming 
the strong and statistically valid positive influence of the price of the borrowed funds on the 
total cost and the much clearer positive influence of the price of the physical capital, while the 
price of labour still reveals mixed results. 
 
From the residuals of the estimated more complete model (see Appendix III), we also obtain the 
country efficiency scores, which are presented in Appendix V.  For each panel, the best result is 
obtained by the country with the best practice, that is, the country with least waste in its 
production process. All the other countries are classified in relation to the panel´s benchmark. 
Table 4 below reports the country efficiency rankings by panel and clearly shows that there are 




















                                                            
1 Other models were estimated in order to check the validity of these results with different combinations of the 
outputs, inputs and their products. The results obtained will be provided on request.  
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Finland  Finland  Finland  Finland  Estonia Bulgaria 
Sweden Sweden Sweden Luxembourg Lithuania Malta 
Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg Sweden Malta Lithuania 
Ireland Ireland Ireland Ireland Bulgaria Estonia 
Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark Slovakia Slovakia 
Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Latvia Latvia 
Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium Slovenia Slovenia 
Italy Italy Italy Italy Romania Cyprus 
Spain Spain Spain Spain Cyprus Romania 
UK UK UK UK Czech Rep. Czech Rep. 
Germany Germany Germany Germany Hungary Poland 
France France France France Poland Hungary 
Estonia Bulgaria Greece Greece   
Bulgaria Lithuania Portugal Portugal   
Lithuania Malta Austria Austria   
Malta Estonia     
Slovakia Slovakia     
Latvia Latvia     
Romania Slovenia     
Slovenia Romania     
Cyprus Cyprus     
Czech Rep. Czech Rep.     
Hungary Hungary     
Poland Poland     
Greece Greece     
Portugal Portugal     
Austria Austria     
 
 
The results obtained with the β-Convergence test are presented in Appendix VI and the values 
of the estimated β are also reported in Table 5. For almost all panels (the only exception is the 
EU-12 panel for the time period 2000-2008), the estimated β are statistically significant and 
negative, revealing convergence processes, although these are not very fast, since the values are 
relatively small. Nevertheless, the acceleration of the convergence process is very clear during 
the last decade (here the period 2000-2008) for all EU-27 countries and particularly for the EU-











1994 – 2008 
 
2000 – 2008 
 EU27 EU15 EU12 EU27 EU15 EU12 
β:       
coefficient -.0123885 -.1426132 -.1623192 -.1167656 -.3616606 .0794333 
p -4.31 -3.95    -3.21    -2.03    -3.75 1.60    
P>|p| 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.044 0.000 0.114 
 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions  
Efficiency is always a concept that relates, in a production function, the allocation of scarce 
resources or inputs, with the obtained outputs defining the production possibility frontier. Thus, 
technical efficiency will always be a relative measurement of the distance to the frontier, 
depending on the definition of the production function and the specific inputs and outputs 
included in this function. 
One of the advantages of the use of the method of econometric frontiers is that it allows the 
decomposition of the deviations from the efficient frontier (the error, ε) between the stochastic 
error (the noise, v) and the pure inefficiency (u). Another important advantage is the guarantee 
that if we include an irrelevant variable in the function, the econometric frontier method will 
detect this irrelevance and the variable will have a very low, or even zero, weight in the 
definition of the efficiency results. 
However, in spite of these technical advantages, the analysis of bank efficiency always raises 
some specific concerns over the definition of the appropriate inputs and outputs to be included 
in the production function.  
In this paper, we opt to use the intermediation approach and, taking into account the specific 
character of the bank production activities and the available data, we define a cost frontier 
function considering three outputs (total loans, total securities and other earning assets) and the 
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prices of three inputs (borrowed funds, physical capital and labour). We also include three other 
variables that may influence the efficiency results, namely, the number of banks, the equity ratio 
and the ratio revenue over expenses.  
Our data are taken from the Bankscope database, which is recognised as one of the best sources, 
since it includes data for all EU countries and guarantees standardisation and comparability, 
providing data on banks accounting for around 90% of total assets. Nevertheless, Bankscope 
data can still be very unbalanced, at least in the number of included banks. Our Appendix I 
clearly shows that around 30% of the included banks are from one country (Germany) and the 
banks of four countries (Germany, France, Italy and UK) account for half of the banks 
considered. On the other hand, while it is true that the number of banks can be important, we 
should also take into account their weight and the degree of concentration in the specific bank 
market.  
With regard to the variables, Bankscope does not directly provide the prices of the production 
inputs. Therefore, we consider proxies of these prices; specifically, for the price of the borrowed 
funds, we took the ratio interest expense over the sum of deposits, for physical capital, the ratio 
of the non-interest expenses over fixed assets and for the price of labour, the ratio personnel 
expenses over the number of employees.   
For all panels, our estimations point to the dominance of the borrowed funds to explain the 
evolution of the total cost and the relatively low weight of the other two inputs (physical capital 
and labour), which reveal a mixed and unclear influence on the cost. This confirms the 
intermediation approach and the very specific characteristics of the banks’ production process, 
since it depends much more on the borrowed funds than on the traditional production factors. 
On the other hand, with regard to the influence of the considered outputs in the total cost, the 
validation of the intermediation approach is reinforced as total cost clearly always grows in line 
with the provided total loans. Generally speaking, we can also accept that an increase of 
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provided total securities will contribute to the growth of the total cost, while the influence of the 
other earning assets (here, the difference between the total earning assets and the total loans) is 
not so clear. However, taking into particular account the results obtained with the simplified 
model (Appendix IV), we can also conclude that total cost positively depends on the increase of 
the other earning assets. 
As expected, the total cost always increases with the growth of the considered banks and the 
equity ratio (a possible proxy for the accepted risk) and decreases with the ratio revenue over 
expenses.  Furthermore, in all situations the time trend variable, which can be interpreted as the 
neutral technological changes, clearly contributes to the decrease of the total cost. 
Our results also very clearly point to the existence of statistically important technical 
inefficiency in all panels, although this appears to decline in recent years (2000-2008), once 
again in all panels. Regarding the obtained ranking positions, there are very few changes in the 
efficiency rankings of the EU countries.  
Moreover, the obtained results confirm the existence of a convergence process, but in spite of 
the clear acceleration of this process during the last decade (2000-2008), it is still quite slow and 
does not raise any credible prospects of full integration being achieved in the near future. 
These results do not allow us to support the validity of the Law of One Price in the European 
bank markets. In an increasingly competitive environment, the ability to create differentiated 
products is crucial and financial products have become increasingly complex, so that market and 
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APPENDIX I – Panel stochastic frontier models 
 
For panel data models, and particularly with stochastic frontier models, it is necessary not only 
to suppose the normality for the noise error term (v) and half- or truncated normality for the 
inefficiency error term (u), but also to assume that the firm specific level of inefficiency is 
uncorrelated with the input levels. This type of model also addresses the fundamental question 
of how and whether inefficiencies vary over time.  
 
Following Battese and Coelli (1988) and Battese et al. (1989), a general panel stochastic frontier 






























































































So, as Ti increases γi will decrease. If Ti →∞ , γi → 0, so ii u→− ε  and there are clear 


















APPENDIX II – Number of banks (and %) by country 
 
 
Country 1994 2000 2008 Average  
(1994-2008) 
Austria 54  (2.34) 129  (4.92) 147  (6.92) 127  (4.90) 
Belgium 88  (3.82) 68  (2.60)   34  (1.60)   72  (2.78) 
Bulgaria 10  (0.43)  25  (0.95)   21  (0.99) 23  (0.89) 
Cyprus 12  (0.52) 23  (0.88)   9  (0.42) 18  (0.69) 
Czech Rep. 24  (1.04) 27 (1.03)   20  (0.94) 26  (1.00) 
Denmark 98  (4.25) 123  (4.69) 109  (5.13) 116  (4.48) 
Estonia 9  (0.39) 10  (0.38) 10  (0.47) 11  (0.42) 
Finland 11  (0.48) 14  (0.53) 12  (0.56) 13  (0.50) 
France 350  (15.18) 308  (11.76) 204  (9.60) 297  (11.46) 
Germany 786  (34.08) 771  (29.43) 593  (27.92) 738  (28.48) 
Greece 25  (1.08) 26  (0.99) 29  (1.37) 32  (1.24) 
Hungary 30  (1.30) 39  (1.49) 26  (1.22) 34  (1.31) 
Ireland 24  (1.04) 42  (1.60) 40  (1.88) 42  (1.62) 
Italy 177  (7.68) 216  (8 .24) 199  (9.37) 231  (8.92) 
Latvia 16  (0.69) 25  (0.95) 33  (1.55) 27  (1.04) 
Lithuania 7  (0.30) 16  (0.61) 15  (0.71) 14  (0.54) 
Luxembourg 118  (5.12) 112  (4.27) 80  (3.77) 106  (4.09) 
Malta 8  (0.35) 10  (0.38) 14  (0.66) 12  (0.46) 
Netherlands 50  (2.17) 50  (1.91) 41  (1.93) 57  (2.20) 
Poland 33  (1.43) 50  (1.91) 37  (1.74) 48  (1.85) 
Portugal 34  (1.47) 37  (1.41) 25  (1.18) 36  (1.39) 
Romania 3  (0.13) 31  (1.18) 27  (1.27) 23  (0.89) 
Slovakia 11  (0.48) 22  (0.84) 16  (0.75) 19  (0.73) 
Slovenia 14  (0.61) 25  (0.95) 21  (0.99) 23  (0.89) 
Spain 172  (7.46) 204  (7.79) 136  (6.40) 196  (7.56) 
Sweden 14  (0.61) 22  (0.84) 78  (3.67) 60  (2.32) 
UK 128  (5.55) 195  (7.44) 148  (6.97) 190  (7.33) 










1994 – 2008 
 
2000 – 2008 
 EU27 EU15 EU12 EU27 EU15 EU12 
Constant:       
coefficient 4.5533 4.7331   7.9005   10.641   1.4500   8.2714    
z 6.20    4.60   5.17 6.16   0.48   2.12    
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.634 0.034 
Y1:       
coefficient .3304    .3279      .0447    .1061    1.0492      .6560     
z 2.13    1.08 0.16    0.42    1.63 1.63 
P>|z| 0.033 0.279 0.874 0.671 0.104 0.102     
Y2:       
coefficient .0444       .3906    .0245    1.1363      1.6670    .7928    
z 0.26 0.82 0.10    3.15    2.14    1.41 
P>|z| 0.796 0.412 0.917 0.002 0.032 0.158 
Y3:       
coefficient .0493    -.1399    .0639    -1.3520   -1.6713   -1.3663    
z 0.21 -0.24 0.18    -2.77 -1.63 -1.87    
P>|z| 0.836 0.807 0.856 0.006 0.103 0.062 
W1:       
coefficient .6541    1.4086    .0269    1.6380    1.8361    .3792    
z 4.64 4.95 0.11    6.12    4.66    0.61 
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.913 0.000 0.000 0.541 
W2:       
coefficient -.1577    -.7262    -.3029    -.9761    .0604    1.4043    
z -0.97 -2.71 -1.09    -3.59    0.12    -1.81 
P>|z| 0.331 0.007 0.278 0.000 0.906 0.071 
24 
 
W3:       
coefficient -.0496    -.1763    -.6446    .5571    -.5339      .1188    
z -0.95 -2.70 -3.67 4.60    -1.88 0.29 
P>|z| 0.343     0.007 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.773 
Y1Y1:       
coefficient .0431     .0253    .0373    .0673    .0597    .0715    
z 2.62 0.81    1.85    3.46 1.74 2.60 
P>|z| 0.009 0.418 0.064 0.001 0.082 0.009 
Y1Y2:       
coefficient .0633       .1055    .0533    .0030    -.0139    -.0687    
z 2.57 1.51    1.94    0.09    -0.13 -2.02    
P>|z| 0.010 0.132 0.053 0.927 0.898 0.044 
Y1Y3:       
coefficient -.1438    -.1737    -.1076    -.1076    -.1498    -.0934    
z -3.74    -1.95    -2.27    -2.23    -1.15    -1.65 
P>|z| 0.000 0.052 0.023 0.026 0.252 0.099 
Y2Y2:       
coefficient .0025    -.1381    .0107    .0265    .2420    .0540    
z 0.22    -1.62 0.84    1.47    2.08    2.91 
P>|z| 0.828 0.106 0.402 0.141 0.037 0.004 
Y2Y3:       
coefficient -.0714    .1515    -.0660    -.1079    -.5395    -.0681    
z -2.27    0.85    -1.76    -2.39 -2.04    -1.32    
P>|z| 0.023 0.393 0.078 0.017 0.042 0.188 
Y3Y3:       
coefficient .1201    .0368    .0959    .1486       .3938     .1291       
z 3.81 0.33    2.40    3.34    2.18    2.53 
P>|z| 0.000 0.739 0.016 0.001 0.029 0.012 
W1W1:       
coefficient .0056    .0384    .0386    .0955    .0702    .0534       
z 0.40    1.07    2.38    4.95    1.90    1.94    
P>|z| 0.688 0.285 0.017 0.000 0.057 0.053 
W1W2:       
coefficient .0441    .0655    -.0118    .0804    .0446    -.0112    
z 2.15 2.18    -0.39    3.09    1.24    -0.18    
P>|z| 0.031 0.029 0.698 0.002 0.217 0.859 
W1W3:       
coefficient .0029    .0225       .0112    .0064    .0331   .0160    
z 0.45 1.71    0.78    0.61    1.65    0.48    
P>|z| 0.650 0.088 0.436     0.543 0.099 0.632 
W2W2:       
coefficient -.0393    -.1110    .0099    -.0157    -.0482    -.0021      
z -2.60 -5.64    0.41    -0.72 -1.50 -0.04    
P>|z| 0.009 0.000 0.682     0.472 0.133 0.971 
W2W3:       
coefficient .0070   -.0446    .0280    -.0305    .0006    -.0252     
z 0.80    -2.80 1.74    -2.24    0.02    -0.46    
P>|z| 0.423 0.005 0.082 0.025 0.983 0.643 
W3W3:       
coefficient -.0030     -.0062    -.0075    .0082       -.0182    -.0106    
z -1.73 -2.26    -1.23    2.66 -2.38    -0.95    
P>|z| 0.083 0.024 0.220 0.008 0.017 0.341 
Y1W1:       
coefficient -.0283    -.1721    .0145    -.0045    -.1058    .0465    
z -1.41    -4.02    0.59    -0.17 -2.28 1.07    
P>|z| 0.157 0.000 0.558 0.866 0.023 0.285 
Y1W2:       
coefficient -.0114     .0825    -.0796    .0597    .1085    .0129    
z -0.49 2.54    -2.32    2.04    2.99 0.22 
P>|z| 0.625 0.011 0.020 0.041 0.003 0.828 
Y1W3:       
coefficient -.0050    .0178     .0600       -.0158    .0472    .0444    
z -0.68 1.29 3.75    -1.47    1.55 1.32    
P>|z| 0.500 0.198 0.000 0.142 0.120 0.186 
Y2W1:       
coefficient .0118       .1485    -.0206    .1290    .1155    .0270    
z 0.52 2.03    -0.77    2.82    1.45 0.39    
P>|z| 0.603 0.043 0.442 0.005 0.148 0.697 
Y2W2:       
coefficient -.1061      -.2465    -.0587    -.1443    -.0379   -.1133     
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z -3.15 -4.47 -1.13    -3.68    -0.42 -1.82    
P>|z| 0.002 0.000 0.258 0.000 0.672 0.069 
Y2W3:       
coefficient -.0050     -.0298    -.0776    .0482    .0328    -.0190    
z -0.52 -1.32 -3.40    2.82 0.80    -0.31    
P>|z| 0.606 0.188 0.001 0.005 0.421 0.754 
Y3W1:       
coefficient .0128       -.0102    .0517    -.1496    -.0589    -.0431    
z 0.42 -0.12 1.35    -2.92    -0.63    -0.54    
P>|z| 0.671 0.904 0.176 0.003 0.527 0.591 
Y3W2:       
coefficient .1327       .2113    .1555    .1609    -.0633    .1874    
z 3.07 2.85    2.45    3.04 -0.54 2.36    
P>|z| 0.002 0.004 0.014   0.002 0.593 0.018 
Y3W3:       
coefficient .0128    .0258    .0565    -.0649    -.0395    -.0268    
z 0.93 1.09 1.91    -3.05    -0.76    -0.40    
P>|z| 0.350 0.276 0.057 0.002 0.450 0.692 
       
Z1:       
coefficient .0082     .0127    .1095    .0101    .0162    .0486     
z 0.44 0.70 3.16    0.46 0.58 1.23    
P>|z| 0.662 0.485 0.002 0.643 0.563 0.218 
Z2:       
coefficient .0647       .1703    .0343     .1589    .1265    -.0256    
z 2.76 3.85    1.11    4.06    2.41    -0.46    
P>|z| 0.006 0.000 0.266 0.000 0.016 0.648 
Z3:       
coefficient -.7141      -.9609    -.4682    -.5947    -.6249      -.3441     
z -10.37 -7.83    -5.88    -7.47    -5.10    -3.39    
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
t:       
coefficient -.0048 -.0081 -.0050    -.0224    -.0212   -.0010    
z -1.80 -2.21 -0.98 -5.95    -6.35    -0.48    
P>|z| 0.072 0.027 0.329 0.000 0.000 0.633 
       
mu       
coefficient .9236       .2838   .2703       .6571   .3868   .5147    
z 4.06    1.04   2.63   4.39   3.24   4.34    
P>|z| 0.000 0.296 0.009 0.000 0.001 0.000 
       
lnsigma2       
coefficient -.6859    -1.7873     -3.3358   -1.6154   -2.5925   -2.6451    
z -1.57 -1.83 -6.23   -3.23 -4.20 -4.96    
P>|z| 0.117 0.067 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000   
       
ilgtgamma       
coefficient 4.3682    3.8951   1.7286   4.1601   3.6285   3.4378    
z 9.67 3.83 2.68   7.70 5.47 5.94 
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
sigma2       
Coefficient .5036 .1674   .0356   .1988    .0748   .0710    
Standard error .2205 .1631 .0191 .0994 .0462   .0379 
       
gamma       
Coefficient .9875    .9801   .8492   .9846    .9741   .9689    
Standard error .0056 .0199 .0827 .0082 .0167 .0175 
       
sigma_u2       
Coefficient .4973    .1641     .0302   .1957    .0729   .0688    
Standard error .2205 .1632 .0191 .0995 .0462713 .0379 
       
sigma_v2       
Coefficient .0063     .0033   .0054   .0031    .0019    .0022    
Standard error .0005 .0003 .0006 .0003 .0003 .0003 
       
Wald chi2(31) 15874.87 8992.55 13427.32 9552.96 5852.91 8504.17 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
       
26 
 
Log likelihood 361.60132 278.76336 190.12184 277.52094 189.10569 144.04883 
N 405 225 180 243 135 108 
 
 
(*) TC = Total cost (dependent variable) = natural logarithm of the sum of the interest expenses plus the total 
operating expenses  
 
Outputs: Y1 = Total loans = natural logarithm of the loans 
Y2 = Total securities = natural logarithm of the total securities 
                           Y3 = Other earning assets = natural logarithm of difference between the total earning assets and the total 
loans 
 
Inputs: W1 = Price of the borrowed funds = natural logarithm of the ratio interest expenses over the sum of deposits;  
             W2 = Price of physical capital = natural logarithm of the ratio non-interest expenses over fixed assets 
                     W3 = Price of labour = natural logarithm of the ratio personnel expenses over the number of employees 
 
Other variables: Z1 = Number of banks= natural logarithm of the number of banks included in the panels 
             Z2 = Equity ratio = natural logarithm of the ratio equity over total assets 
             Z3 = Ratio revenue over expenses   = natural logarithm of the ratio of the total revenue over the total 
expenses 














1994 – 2008 
 
2000 – 2008 
 EU27 EU15 EU12 EU27 EU15 EU12 
Constant:       
coefficient 1.704008    1.436849 3.725444 1.508172 -.4157846 4.894205 
z 8.93    5.47 10.23   4.93 -1.05   11.22 
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.295 0.000 
Y1:       
coefficient .4575199 .5483316 .3794408 .5693051 .7773747 .4458871 
z 28.35    20.18 16.27    30.25 19.68 19.60 
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Y2:       
coefficient .0231095 .0334319 .0276436 -.0117959 -.1326427 .0379789 
z 1.31 0.73    1.37    -0.54    -2.61    1.72    
P>|z| 0.190 0.463 0.172 0.590 0.009 0.085 
Y3:       
coefficient .3180318 .2530069 .3485391 .254392   .3151639 .1929269 
z 11.80 4.50 10.09 7.39 4.16    4.64 
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
W1:       
coefficient .5813181 .5953075 .6232564 .5896733 .6100655   .5941992 
z 35.40    26.52 25.73 33.46 26.12    26.56 
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
W2:       
coefficient .0371296 -.0254601 .1145439 .0708342 .0877214 .1673463 
z 1.82    -1.01    3.67 2.74    2.71    4.00 
P>|z| 0.069 0.313 0.000 0.006 0.007 0.000 
W3:       
coefficient -.008435 .0031862 -.0315724 .0157908 -.0229858 .0270339 
z -1.10    0.38    -2.76    1.34    -1.52    1.85    
P>|z| 0.270 0.705 0.006     0.179 0.128 0.065 
       
t:       
coefficient -.0042361 -.009332 .0120695 -.0194313 -.0258149 .0003669 
z -1.45    -2.49    2.18    -4.94    -5.53 0.13    
27 
 
P>|z| 0.146 0.013 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.896 
       
mu       
coefficient 1.114109 -.0998493 .5355472 1.181618   .4111179   .4174215 
z 4.93    -0.08    4.03    6.19    1.58    1.99    
P>|z| 0.000 0.935 0.000 0.000 0.114 0.047 
       
lnsigma2       
Coefficient -.5008453 -.3119287 -2.592984   -.8834989 -1.615981 -1.942696 
z -1.23    -0.27    -6.22    -2.27    -2.17    -2.74    
P>|z| 0.219 0.787 0.000 0.023 0.030 0.006 
       
ilgtgamma       
coefficient 3.905836 4.640099 1.504086 4.208388 3.778475 3.321973 
z 9.21    3.95 2.87   10.08 4.75 4.41    
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
sigma2       
Coefficient .6060182    .7320337   .0747966   .4133341    .1986957    .1433171    
Standard error .2469018 .8460565 .0312009 .160907 .148247 .1016942 
       
gamma       
Coefficient .9802729    .9904356   .8181831   .9853476    .9776533   .965175     
Standard error .0082009 .0111318 .0779999 .006028 .0173842 .025325 
       
sigma_u2       
Coefficient .5940632    .7250323   .0611973    .4072778   .1942555   .1383261    
Standard error .2469252 .8460843 .031205 .1609701 .1483371 .1017123 
       
sigma_v2       
Coefficient .011955    .0070015   .0135993   .0060564   .0044402   .004991    
Standard error .0008738 .0006908 .0014871 .0005977 .0006059 .0007217 
       
Wald chi2(31) 8183.79 4101.42 5143.74 4559.79 2142.34 3690.80 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
       
Log likelihood 237.26571 194.54221 106.63578 191.7829 134.0707 102.92957 
N 405 225 180 243 135 108 
 
(*) TC = Total cost (dependent variable) = natural logarithm of the sum of the interest expenses plus the total 
operating expenses  
          
         Outputs: Y1 = Total loans = natural logarithm of the loans 
  Y2 = Total securities = natural logarithm of the total securities 
                          Y3 = Other earning assets = natural logarithm of the difference between the total earning assets and the 
total loans 
 
Inputs: W1 = Price of the borrowed funds = natural logarithm of the ratio interest expenses over the sum of deposits;  
              W2 = Price of physical capital = natural logarithm of the ratio non-interest expenses over fixed assets 
                      W3 = Price of labour = natural logarithm of the ratio personnel expenses over the number of employees  
 
















APPENDIX V – Cost efficiency rankings 
 
A – EU-27 
 
 EU27 1994 - 2008 EU27 2000 - 2008 
1 Finland  100.000 Finland  100.000 
2 Sweden 98.947 Sweden 98.917 
3 Luxembourg 98.935 Luxembourg 98.913 
4 Ireland 98.924 Ireland 98.892 
5 Denmark 98.886 Denmark 98.848 
6 Netherlands 98.838 Netherlands 98.801 
7 Belgium 98.830 Belgium 98.785 
8 Italy 98.818 Italy 98.763 
9 Spain 98.792 Spain 98.746 
10 UK 98.774 UK 98.731 
11 Germany 98.772 Germany 98.728 
12 France 98.715 France 98.668 
13 Estonia 98.699 Bulgaria 98.581 
14 Bulgaria 98.684 Lithuania 98.579 
15 Lithuania 98.681 Malta 98.578 
16 Malta 98.662 Estonia 98.572 
17 Slovakia 98.642 Slovakia 98.563 
18 Latvia 98.618 Latvia 98.526 
19 Romania 98.599 Slovenia 98.502 
20 Slovenia 98.594 Romania 98.491 
21 Cyprus 98.580 Cyprus 98.490 
22 Czech Rep. 98.535 Czech Rep. 98.446 
23 Hungary 98.503 Hungary 98.392 
24 Poland 98.491 Poland 98.390 
25 Greece 98.397 Greece 98.303 
26 Portugal 98.389 Portugal 98.286 
27 Austria 98.351 Austria 98.262 
average  98.728  98.658 
median  98.684  98.579 




B – EU-15 
 
 EU15 1994 - 2008 EU15 2000 - 2008 
1 Finland  100.000 Finland  100.000 
2 Sweden 98.933 Luxembourg 98.944 
3 Luxembourg 98.911 Sweden 98.924 
4 Ireland 98.899 Ireland 98.914 
5 Denmark 98.858 Denmark 98.858 
6 Netherlands 98.819 Netherlands 98.826 
7 Belgium 98.795 Belgium 98.806 
8 Italy 98.779 Italy 98.781 
9 Spain 98.773 Spain 98.768 
10 UK 98.751 UK 98.752 
11 Germany 98.744 Germany 98.748 
12 France 98.678 France 98.687 
13 Greece 98.324 Greece 98.286 
14 Portugal 98.323 Portugal 98.277 
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15 Austria 98.271 Austria 98.240 
average  98.791  98.787 
median  98.779  98.781 





C – EU-12 
 
 EU12 1994 - 2008 EU12 2000 - 2008 
1 Estonia 100.000 Bulgaria 100.000 
2 Lithuania 98.999 Malta 98.998 
3 Malta 98.997 Lithuania 98.997 
4 Bulgaria 98.996 Estonia 98.989 
5 Slovakia 98.975 Slovakia 98.982 
6 Latvia 98.951 Latvia 98.962 
7 Slovenia 98.936 Slovenia 98.947 
8 Romania 98.934 Cyprus 98.944 
9 Cyprus 98.930 Romania 98.938 
10 Czech Rep. 98.892 Czech Rep. 98.908 
11 Hungary 98.860 Poland 98.880 
12 Poland 98.859 Hungary 98.876 
average  99.027  99.035 
median  98.943  98.955 







APPENDIX VI – β-Convergence estimates  
 
 
Variable  (*) 
 
1994 – 2008 
 
2000 – 2008 
 EU27 EU15 EU12 EU27 EU15 EU12 
Constant:       
coefficient .1217614    .35908 .4342104 .2965211   1.020656 -.2046035 
p 4.48   4.09   3.24 2.06   3.76 -1.55    
P>|p| 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.041 0.000 0.126 
β:       
coefficient -.0123885 -.1426132 -.1623192 -.1167656 -.3616606 .0794333 
p -4.31 -3.95    -3.21    -2.03    -3.75 1.60    
P>|p| 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.044 0.000 0.114 
       
R-squared   0.1615 0.1173 0.1849 0.0973 0.1623 0.1542 
       
N 378 210 168 216 210 96 
 
            (*) Country dummies were also included in the estimated equations and the results obtained will be 
provided on request  
